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I welcome my thoughtful critics. If there is to be progress in environmental 
ethics, it will result from interchanges such as these. I start with my recent 
experience in Nepal, using that to bring to initial focus where I think my 
differences with Attfield, Brennan, and Minteer lie. Later I turn, in too summary 
a way, to some more specific complaints. 
Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal is a primary sanctuary for Bengal 
tigers and the Asian rhinoceros, both extremely endangered species. Other 
endangered species protected in the area are the sloth bear, the pygmy hog, the 
swamp dear, the black buck, the Asian rock python, and the gharial crocodile (the 
world's most endangered crocodile). The park exists because the region, in 
lowland Nepal, was too malarious to live in year round until the 1950's. In earlier 
years, what is now the park area was kept as a hunting preserve for the Rana rulers 
of Nepal in the dry season. Oddly, the tigers and rhinos survived because of the 
mosquitoes. 
Following a mosquito eradication campaign in mid-century, Nepalis began 
to move into the region. The migrants cleared the forests and started cultivating 
crops, also poaching animals. In 1973, to increase protection, the hunting 
preserve was designated a national park. Nepalis were surrounding it. The 
population of the Terai (lowland) region was 36,000 in 1950; in less than a 
decade it was one million. With one of the highest birthrates in the world, and 
with the influx continuing, the population in 1991 was 8.6 million, 90 percent of 
them poor, 50 percent of them desperately poor (Nepal and Weber 1993; 
Shrestha 1997). 
No one is allowed to live in the park. People complain that they cannot cut 
grasses, graze cattle and buffalo, or timber the park at will. They are allowed to 
cut thatch grasses several days a year, and 30 percent of park income is given to 
Village Development Committees. The Royal Nepalese Army is responsible for 
preventing poaching, grazing, cutting grasses, pilfering timber, and permanent 
habitation of the land. They also do what they can to improve the lot of the people. 
But being hungry is not a sufficient reason to sacrifice the park. That problem 
must be fixed by attacking its root social causes, even though, alas, in my visit 
to Nepal during January and February of this year, I did not find any answers in 
sight. 
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The Smithsonian Institution and the World Wide Fond for Nature conducted 
a Tiger Ecology Project there from 1973 to 1981, using Nepali and American 
researchers. No doubt they were concerned about the pressures of the poor on 
tiger habitat. No doubt also they spent money on preserving the tigers that might 
have been spent relieving poverty. One of their principal recommendations was 
to increase the size of the protected habitat. 
I am arguing (contra Attfield) that such conservation dilemmas are very 
much with us in developing countries, are likely to remain so for some time to 
come, and that such conservation efforts can be morally justified. I argue (contra 
Brennan) that, complex though the social factors that produce poverty may be, 
there is no particular cause here to fault transnational corporations or develop-
ment agencies. About one-half of the government's revenue depends on foreign 
aid and borrowing; one-third of the hard currency entering the country is aid. Nor 
do I fault as 'brutal and ruthless' the Nepali military forces that police the park, 
even though military powers can sometimes be so, as Brennan worries (p. 330). 
Maybe those who eradicated the mosquitoes caused all the trouble; maybe they 
and their international aid-granting supporters were attacking Nepal's poverty in 
the wrong way. Meanwhile, today we ('we' who decide how to help in Nepal) 
have a tough decision. 
I put the tigers first, have financially supported WWF efforts to save Asian 
and African species, and morally approve the present policies, on grounds that 
tigers as a species ought not to be sacrificed on the altar of human mistakes, 
regardless of what persons made mistakes where in the complex chains of events. 
Moved by the lack of medical care in the region, I also sent, upon my return, a 
$5,000 contribution to one of the very few hospitals nearby, which I visited. 
If I did not believe (contra Minteer) that tigers have intrinsic value, if I did 
not believe that species lines are morally considerable, if I thought the values of 
tigers were only those that this or that culture chooses to assign to them, or not, 
I would not be making such efforts to protect them. I puzzle to know what 
arguments (or forces), if any, Minteer would use encountering the Nepalis who 
wish to sacrifice the park to relieve their poverty. Since I am so insensitive to the 
loggers in the Pacific Northwest, he will think worse of my defense of the tigers 
over the poor of Nepal. But why should I accept his views? They are without 
'foundations'; they only come from whatever 'culturally-occupied' subculture 
he belongs to. 
Next, I turn to a selected few of my critics' more specific complaints. 
Faced with a dilemma, we first try to find a way out by showing that it is not 
the dilemma supposed. No hard choices need to be made. We can have our cake 
and eat it too. That is essentially the strategy taken by Attfield. If there were an 
ideal development process, Nepal could have its millions in the Terai and its tiger 
sanctuary as well. Africa could have its present human populations, which are 
typically three times what they were at mid-century, and the rhinos restored, 
which have declined to 2,500 in a quarter century from a population of 60,000, 
a decline of 96 percent (Cunningham and Berger 1997). 
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Of if not so many people, rhinos, or tigers, compromising these numbers, 
there is some way to solve the problem by which people need not get hurt. There 
is no dilemma. Or at least 'such conflicts would be rare' (Attfield, p. 296). That 
is not, however, what the World Health Organization has found: 'Priority given 
to human health raises an ethical dilemma if "health for all" conflicts with 
protecting the environment. ... Priority to ensuring human survival is taken as a 
first-order principle. Respect for nature and control of environmental degrada-
tion is a second-order principle, which must be observed unless it conflicts with 
the first-order principle of meeting survival needs' (WHO Commission on 
Health and Environment 1992:4). That is quite humane; it also means no tigers 
or rhinos. 
Has Attfield forgotten that I began by saying: 'One ought to seek win-win 
solutions whenever one can' (1996:249)? I conceded that some strategies that 
are morally desirable are not politically possible. My analysis is not of some ideal 
world, but of the real world where win-lose decisions face us daily. As much as 
anyone else, I will convert such a situation into win-win if I can. Only I face the 
reality that they do not so easily or so soon convert. 'Population policies (if 
voluntary, and integrated with policies of development) have the potential for 
eventually limiting the incidence of conflicts between preservation and human 
needs' (Attfield, p. 296). Eventually, but the incidence of conflicts has been 
escalating for the last half century, and shows little sign of slacking off, 
especially conflicts threatening the charismatic megafauna. 
It is well enough to conclude that 'the kind of policies needed in the Third 
World are ones which enlist people's energies for producing food and preserving 
nature alike' (Attfield, abstract). No dilemma – if and when we get those 
needed policies. Meanwhile, there is a dilemma now at Royal Chitwan, and if 
we wait for those kinds of policies to work, the tigers and rhinos will be gone.1 
The fact of the matter is that what sustainably gets humans fed in Nepal can and 
probably will sacrifice a great deal of biodiversity. Nature co-opted to feed 
people is seldom wild nature saved. 
With Attfield's complaints about my calling the tenth-child, tenth-child 
multiplication factor a tragedy, I stand by my claims. These numbers are 
admittedly provocative tropes for the real world, where often a women does 
produce five children, on average (as has been true in rural Nepal). Likewise the 
term 'cancer' is deliberately provocative, a shocking term, but there are analo-
gies enough to make it sting, as it did both Attfield and Brennan. "Uncontrolled 
growth' (sometimes named 'cancer' and sometimes 'population explosion') is 
growth gone beserk, pathological, self-defeating, eventually tragic. Even with 
humans there is a good-better-best fallacy. One human is good; more are better. 
And the most is the best? 
Attfield doesn't believe that; he has only three children. Humans too are 
subject to the constraints of exponential growth. Where there are too many 
children, make the best of a bad situation. But do not suppose that it is not a bad 
situation, and learn from it for the next generation. Attfield concedes: 'This could 
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still be a tragedy, all things considered' (p. 299). The reason for the tragedy is 
uncontrolled growth (aka 'cancer'). The uncontrolled growth is not always in 
head count. It can also be in desires for profits, for capital, or the size of one's 
fishing fleet on Lake Victoria, as Brennan notes. It can also be in unnecessary 
consumption. 
Wherever the unregulated human growth, do not suppose that, in such a bad 
situation, one should always solve the problem by sacrificing endangered 
species and their habitat. There are better ways to be humane, as humane as one 
can, but stopping short of extinguishing species, else we lose the species only to 
continue the human tragedy. That brings agonising decisions; it brings Brennan' s 
wrath as 'astonishing misanthropy' (p. 326). On this spectacular planet, with 
many millions of species, maybe it is astonishing anthropocentrism to hold that 
people always come first, no matter what their mistakes, no matter where their 
uncontrolled growth. 
Attfield twists and turns to escape the dilemma, by hoping that poor parents 
might find ways to care for increasing numbers of children with their limited 
resources (the tenth child cooks at the same fire as the first child) (p. 298). But 
he cannot always escape the dilemma, as he himself recognises. He and I mostly 
differ in that I think, in the real world of inflating populations, these dilemmas 
will be common; he thinks, in his more ideal world, they will be rare. I am 
accused of the Malthusian delusion; in reply, I cite the Nepali Terai as evidence 
that there is truth enough there to produce moral agony. 
'Development', Attfield wants to stipulate, should only mean 'change which 
is genuinely for the better, and not just change believed by someone to be such' 
(p. 293). In that case, "bad development' is an oxymoron, and 'sustainable 
development' is a tautology. Meanwhile, we do need some term for what has 
been taking place in Nepal, India, Africa, East Asia and South America over the 
last half century, indeed some term for what has been happening in North 
America and Europe since the Enlightenment, where many changes, brought 
about by people called 'developers' of one kind or another, have brought a 
mixture of good and bad results. 
Depending on one's view of sustainability, there can be much sustainable 
development that sacrifices endangered species and their habitats, which seldom 
need to be kept preserved for these species in order to keep people healthy. 
Typically agriculture introduced to previously wild areas, normally called a 
development, does destroy wildlife habitat. 'Development which is unsustain-
able ... will undermine itself', Attfield assures us (p. 293). Yes, but by the time 
it does, the tigers in Nepal, the rhinos there and in Africa, and the lemurs in 
Madagascar, will be extinct. One of my main points is that the 'feeding people' 
gained by 'sacrificing nature' is, in most cases, only a temporary solution to a 
problem that needs to be solved at its roots in the birthrate patterns or social 
inequities that result in hunger. Else, one will find, a decade later, that the people 
are hungry again, because the problem was not attacked in the right place. 
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Brennan is anxious to get the problems attacked in the right places. That is 
what upsets him about my use of 'we'. I 'adopt "them" and "us" strategies' (p. 
324). 'Elitist Puritan' that I am, I cannot see the connections between their 
poverty and our responsibility. My analysis 'overlooks relevant layers of agency 
and omits significant historical data' (p. 329). My 'we' is speaking from the First 
World; it editorially collects those of us who are involved in deciding where to 
place our efforts and our aid. 'They' are, collectively, those in need of such help. 
Brennan laments that my account, dichotomised so into 'we' and 'they', is 
impoverished by 'the absence of any discussion of the politics of international, 
relations, the ethics of holarchies and the forces which simultaneously drive 
human impoverishment, disease and environmental destruction." Pending a 
'detailed analysis' of all these factors, which might find us as implicated as them, 
we ought not to advocate 'sealing off the last remaining wild places while hungry 
people die at the fences' (p. 324). 
I am much faulted for my 'silence' about these complexities, these other 
actors lurking further back who are more responsible than the up front poor. 
Well, I could only do so much in one article. Brennan' s paper is much longer than 
mine that he critiques, and he concludes with an apology that his own analysis 
lacks detail. I warned, in the third paragraph, about 'abstracting from the 
complex circumstances of decision' (1998:248-249). I thought I had said clearly 
enough that the problem had to be fixed where it arose, in social structures, and 
could not really be fixed by sacrificing wild nature (1998:255). I diagrammed 
my disapproval of the five-to-one inequitable distribution of resources, North 
versus South, G-7 versus G-77, rich versus poor (1998:256). I censured military 
spending (1998:251 -252). I noted that exploiters are amply ready to exploit both 
people and nature, both in the U.S, where people go hungry, and abroad. How 
is this a simplistic 'individualist stance'? (Brennan, p. 324). 
I nowhere said that 'we' are guiltless. I did say that 'we' Americans (and 
everybody else) sometimes correctly give priority to other values besides 
feeding the poor, as Brennan likewise does, when he educates his children, or 
flies regularly from Australia to Norway and Belgium to serve as a visiting 
professor. One minute Brennan is complaining that I know no guilt in my 
American culture; the next he is calling me a reversed Puritan Romantic 
(whatever that means) because 1 see so much sin in society and none in nature. 
I thought I complained about escalating consumerism. I advocated 'taxing the 
wealthy to feed the poor', 'using the produce of the already domesticated 
landscape justly and charitably' (1998:255). 
Brennan and I differ, as nearly as I can make out, in that, until he can analyse 
and fix the Nepali problem by remedying these complicated networks at many 
levels, he will let people into Chitwan National Park, on grounds that sealing 
them out is not morally defensible. Of course, long before he gets the problem 
fixed, there will be no tigers in his morally improved world, as there will be none 
in Attfield's world. He doesn't want to be a Puritan, and there he may succeed. 
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But the people in his tigerless world may still be hungry. Waiting for his program 
to work he has decided against the tigers by default. 
Turning to Minteer, whose concern – on first appearances at least – is 
radically different, consider the foundations of these ethics that Attfield, Brennan, 
and I have been debating. I, for one, do not mind having an environmental ethics 
with some 'foundations.' Does Minteer want one without foundations? Yes, he 
urges us, in conclusion, to 'become comfortable with the contingency of our 
values' (p. 346). But then again, no, he wants his foundations to be in culture, not 
in nature. He wants environmental ethics to be 'more culturally-occupied' (p. 
335). His ethics 'places human cultural experience into the foreground' (p. 335, 
p. 344). I want, he thinks, to 'retreat from culture.' 'Retreat', like foundationalist', 
(and like Brennan's 'Romantic Puritanism', fleeing evil culture) is being used 
pejoratively. If I were choosing the words, I would say that I want to 'go beyond' 
culture, or be more 'inclusive' than building an ethic only on contingent human 
preferences. 
I do not want to be too purely 'culturally-occupied.' I am not sure (contra 
Minteer) that I need 'the purest . . . foundationalism' either (p. 337). But I do want 
to know enough about the natural world, independently of human cultures, to 
form some judgments about whether there are intrinsic values present which, 
when I encounter them, I ought appropriately to respect. I find that this respect 
for nonhuman values does at times shape my behaviour when dealing with the 
natural world. Most of our decisions are made, I concede, with culture in the 
foreground; but some should be made bringing into focus this 'background' that 
is, after all, our life-support system, and not only ours but that of many millions 
of other species. Now we can see that Minteer's concerns about whether to put 
society or nature up front do connect with Attfield's and Brennan' s concerns that I 
sometimes prioritise nature over culture. 
Should our environmental ethics be more 'culturally-occupied' (aka cultur-
ally constructed)? Ought it to be built up when various parties, choosing their 
values in nature, meet together democratically and put their puzzle pieces 
together? Elsewhere, I have addressed the question of the social construction of 
nature, an analysis that Minteer seems not to know. Readers who wish to explore 
this issue in more depth may wish to consult my argument, which is, briefly, that 
'we cannot correctly value what we do not to some degree correctly know' 
(Rolston, 1997:40). 'Nature,' 'environment', 'wilderness', 'science', 'Earth', and 
'value'  so we are being told by post-modernists – are social constructs, by 
some accounts nothing but social constructs. Our language so colours up what 
we see that we do not really see what is there at all. We frame up whatever is out 
there in some 'context,' constituting it out of our interactive experience. I do want 
to retreat from this avant garde in cultural studies. 
I seek indeed to put humans 'in context', not only with other humans, but as 
members with myriads of other species in a biotic community of life on Earth. 
I am resisting putting everything else on Earth in 'our context', on the flimsy 
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grounds that we really cannot know anything in any other way. Within cultures, 
analogously, 1 do not seek to deal with Africans only in my American context 
on grounds that 1 cannot know their alien culture in any other way. Our human 
'context' is both ecological and social, both natural and cultural. We have 
considerable powers, enhanced in both science and ethics, to see more disinter-
estedly. 
We are able, to some degree, to separate out culture from wild nature, as we 
do when we designate a wilderness, and set it aside as a place where humans only 
visit and do not remain, where the works of humans are substantially unnotice- 
able. I do not need 'immutable first principles which enjoy a universal currency' 
(p. 334) (high class language, used with a pejorative twist). But I do need nature 
there in, with, and under culture, nature as the environment of culture. I need that 
much foundation. I do not need 'Truth' (p. 337) (again with a high sounding, 
pejorative capital T). I do need in some degree correctly to know something 
objective (what is the case apart from my subjective 'horizon of significance' [p. 
341]) about the fauna and flora that Minteer is so ready to evaluate without any 
sure knowledge of these things at all. Far from impoverishing the values we seek 
to optimise in ethical decisions, I would like to 'thicken and deepen' this ethic 
(Minteer, p. 344) to count nonhumans morally, in ways in which Minteer, with 
his limited socially constrained epistemic capacities, will be incompetent to do. 
He can only be pragmatic about it, 
I puzzle over Minteer's complaint that my ethic is somehow not 'experience- 
based', not 'historical'. In my Environmental Ethics (1987), the opening chapter 
lists a taxonomy of fourteen types of values carried by nature, of which most are 
experientially based. The closing chapter, on persons in natural history, con-
cludes insisting on a need for 'personal backing' to an environmental ethic by 
those who live in 'storied residence' on their landscapes (Rolston 1987). 
Minteer complains that I do not address conflicts between environmental 
protection and moral commitments to humans 'in any significant sense' (p. 342). 
Needless to say, having been taken to task by Attfield and Brennan for arguing 
that we ought sometimes to save nature rather than feed people, I can only 
conclude that Minteer has not adequately read my other work. 
I do not find it 'curious' to speak of 'a world beyond the human mind', as 
Minteer laments (p. 337). Every time he seeks to couple up both social and 
natural values, Minteer concedes that there is a world out there, outside the 
human mind, of which we can take some account. I would find it curious to know 
how Minteer makes his way around if he does not believe in such a world, and 
does not know something reliable about it (where the frees are and the tigers 
aren't). 
Minteer, I am sure, knows where the trees and the tigers are; his problem is 
that he does not know how to value them except insofar as he, or his culture, or 
subculture, chooses to take up some attitude toward them. Other cultures may 
take up other attitudes. The Nepalis might choose to burn the Chitwan sal forest 
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for fuel, shoot the tigers, and graze their cattle and buffalo in the former park. If 
that is their cultural occupation, well and good. Or, if within our American 
culture, 'everyday citizens' did see 'the great forests of the Northwest as a 
resource to be taken possession of, exploited. (a characteristic view, I still 
maintain, of lumbermen who have cut the redwoods and Douglas-firs over many 
decades) (Minteer, p. 338), nobody thinking otherwise could complain, neither 
Minteer nor environmentalists who think that these old growth forests might 
contain values being overlooked. Nobody knows whether there is any intrinsic 
value out there worth respecting. There are no 'privileged' views, only 'ideolo-
gies', Minteer's included (cf. Minteer, p. 336, p. 343). 
Minteer will reply that he wants to take account of a pluralism of values in 
human experiences. He wants a democratic debate among contesting parties (p. 
347). I think he is left in a muddle. Talk about a debate that is a 'non-starter'! (p. 
343). In this one, there are no grounds (aka 'foundations') for argument: the 
outcome will be only be the resultant in a power struggle, which may be disguised 
as 'pragmatic'. One thing of which Minteer cannot take adequate account is what 
was there before these contingent human valuers, sometimes exploiters, came 
around, such as those rhinoceros and tigers, or the old growth forests, and what 
might still be there, even if only in relics, should humans choose to preserve it. 
With that (against Brennan) I confess to find in my nature 'Puritanism', not moral 
virtue, not 'purity', but value worthy of respect in wild things, sufficient at times 
to take priority over human needs. I run the risk of being misanthropic; that is 
better than to risk being an arrogant humanist. And I welcome continuing debate 
about how, in these dilemmas, to be most humane. 
NOTE 
1 The Vitousek claim about humans capturing 40% of the terrestrial primary product is not 
essential to my argument, as Attfield recognises. Sagoff s easy dismissal that all of North 
America was co-opted already in 1492, since the Indians roamed over all of it, is no serious 
response. Modern agriculture, range management, timbering, irrigation, road-building, 
and so on have dramatically co-opted the American landscape, easily 40% of it, as native 
Americans never did. Herman Daly, in his response to Sagoff judges the Vitousek 
calculation 'a reasonable estimate to put some quantitative dimension on the scale of the 
human economy relative to the total ecosystem' (1995: 623). 
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